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This survey provides an in-depth analysis of existing research on the economic analysis of 
terrorism and counter-terrorist measures. First the existing evidence on the causes of terrorism 
is analyzed, then we consider the evidence of the consequences of terrorism and we 
demonstrate why it is important to regarding of the issue of counter-terrorism policy. 
Moreover the survey presents the existing knowledge on the interrelation between the 
economy and the issue of security and it incorporates analysis the level of knowledge about 
the causal chains between security and the economy. Also it focuses on perspective and 
methodologies from the discipline of economics but also refers to research from related 
disciplines (sociology, political science). It also assembles the knowledge on the impact of 
terrorism on the economy as reflected in macro-economic variables and its impact on specific 
sectors. Furthermore it assesses how potential an actual terrorist event determine consumer 
and producer behaviour, public policy, as well as terrorist responses to these policies. Finally 
a European perspective on the terrorism security annexes is discussed and here we analyze  
the causes of terrorism in Europe. 
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The economics of security is one of the most important issues in our discipline, yet, the one 
least researched (Martin Feldstein (5. 1. 2007), Former President of the American Economics 
Association. 
“Economic theory in particular can offer key insights, enabling governments to optimise their 
efforts to enhance security and growth” (ESRAB, 2006). 
 
 
This paper consists of two parts (WP-nos. 3011 and 3012). Part I comprises chapters 1 to 
4 and part II comprises chapters 5 to 9 – including also the references. Interaction of Actors of Insecurities and Security  
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5  INTERACTION OF ACTORS OF INSECURITY AND SECURITY 
This section concentrates on counter-terrorism policies and the dynamics between “actions of 
security and insecurity”. Earlier, we described the terrorists’ calculus, where the actual level 
of terrorist activity is dependent upon the costs, benefits and relative costs (opportunity costs) 
of terrorism. Consequently, counter-terrorism policies should reduce terrorist activity by (i) 
increasing of the costs of terrorism, (ii) reducing of the benefits from terrorist actions and (iii) 
making non-violent alternatives to terrorism more attractive (Frey and Luechinger 2008). An 
increase in the costs of terrorism is usually associated with an aggressive counter-terrorism 
strategy (deterrence) which uses harsh means such as pre-emption, retaliation or punishment. 
A reduction of terrorism benefits usually involves a rather defensive policy approach; this 
strategy acknowledges the main goals of terrorism (political and economic destabilization, 
and media attention) and tries to reduce payoffs from terrorist actions accordingly. Raising the 
opportunity costs of terrorism involves policies which offer positive incentives for potential 
terrorists. Implicitly, this line of argumentation is closely linked to the discussion of the 
‘causes of terrorism’ which we presented in Section 3 of this contribution. By ameliorating 
conditions which may have otherwise provided incentives for terrorism (e.g. poverty, slow 
growth, repression, discrimination), it becomes less attractive for potential terrorists or terror-
ism supporters to engage in violence, even as the actual costs and benefits of terrorism do not 
change. 
In the following, we will discuss several contributions which deal with counter-terrorism 
strategies along the aforementioned lines. Here, we focus on defensive policies as well as 
proactive ones; in any case, we will come back to the underlying argumentation of the terror-
ists’ calculus, i.e., to the policy effects on cost-benefit (and opportunity cost) considerations 
of terrorists. Still, we will also center on the repercussions of such strategies (i.e., the interac-
tion of security measures and insecurity). As Enders and Sandler (2006) point out, security 
measures often do not take their full dynamic costs into consideration, failing to recognize 
that terrorist behavior is not static but adapts to security measures. In fact, terrorism, e.g., may 
increase instead of decrease when facing new or elevated security measures, so such repercus-
sions add to the economic costs of security. Also, terror may not only increase over time, but 
also shift geographically, taking advantage of weakest links in relatively less protected areas. 
Moreover, security measures may not influence the level of terrorism but its tactics, e.g., by 
making skyjacking less attractive by increased airport security.42 
5.1  Defensive policies  
5.1.1  Protecting targets against attacks  
Protecting targets aims to raise the costs of an attack by increasing the difficulty for terrorists 
to strike and reach their target and by increasing the risk of failure (Enders and Sandler 2006). 
                                                                          
42 Jackson et al. (2007) provide an extensive study on how certain terrorist groups (e.g., the IRA) have adopted to 
counter-terrorism measures. Evidently, groups such as the IRA have not reacted to counter-terrorism with a 
reduction of terrorism but with a change in their modus operandi. This means that we should always keep in mind 
when discussing the effectiveness of terrorism that counter-terrorism may produce a simple substitution and not a 
(desired) elimination effect. Interaction of Actors of Insecurities and Security  
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Activities may include the installment of surveillance technology and placement of security 
personnel such as the introduction of metal detectors at airports in the 1970s or the fortifica-
tion of embassies. Legal measures at national, regional or international level which lead to 
tightening of legal action taken against terrorists have a similar effect. Ultimately, all these 
actions aim at deterring terrorists from their terrorist activities in favor of other political 
means. 
Enders and Sandler (2006) empirically analyze the effects of some protective measures, in-
cluding the introduction of metal detectors at airports, the fortification of US embassies and 
the passing of international conventions. They show that metal detectors introduced in order 
to decrease skyjackings have proven effective insofar as they reduced the number of skyjack-
ings by 12.2 incidents per quarter. However, rather than actually reducing terrorist activity, 
the introduction of metal detectors appears to have produced a shift of terrorist attention away 
from more costly skyjackings towards relatively “cheaper” hostage takings, indicated by an 
increase of 3.68 incidents per quarter of the latter. In contrast, international conventions43 do 
not show to have had a significant effect on terrorist attacks, since these conventions do not as 
such reduce terrorists’ resource base or lower the relative costs of non-terrorist activities. 
While Landes (1978) and Cauley and Iksoon (1988) provides earlier evidence that increased 
security measures at airports (e.g., mandatory preboarding searches of passengers) has con-
tributed to a reduction in airplane hijackings, Cauley and Iksoon (1988) similarly argue that 
substitution (transference) has taken place, where skyjackings have been replaced by 
“cheaper” means of terrorism (cf. Jackson et al. 2007) 
However, continued attempts to target for example major airports such as Heathrow, who 
since 9/11 have seen a decisive increase in security measures, contradict the prediction that 
terrorists will seek the weakest link to minimize costs. It appears that they are willing to pay 
higher prices and take on greater risks for a potentially higher return on a more prestigious 
target. 
5.1.2 Mitigating  impacts   
A complementary action to protecting targets is the mitigation of actual impacts, which in 
theory does not raise costs but aims to lower the benefits resulting from a terrorist attack (En-
ders and Sandler 2006). Frey (2004) and Frey and Luechinger (2004, 2008) suggests two 
measures to reduce the benefits derived from terrorism: (i) decentralization and (ii) changes in 
media reporting practices.44 Obviously, these strategies are directly linked to the central short-
run goals of terrorism, namely economic and political destabilization, and media attention. 
Political decentralization (e.g., via federalism or another form of division of power) makes 
attacks on political targets less attractive; even as an attack is successful, the effect of the 
attack on the general polity is less sizeable, compared to a comparable attack in a centralized 
country (Frey and Luechinger 2004). Economic decentralization (which should develop rather 
automatically in market economies) has a similar effect on terrorism benefits; even the attacks 
                                                                          
43 These conventions include for example the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes 
against Internationally Protected Persons (1973) and the UN Resolution against Taking Hostages (1985) and 
other conventions against hijackings. 
44 Neither of these approaches remains uncontested but a detailed discussion of their implications surpasses the 
scope of this document and is not necessary for the actual core argument. Interaction of Actors of Insecurities and Security  
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of 9/11 had no lasting impact as non-affected personnel and market participants were able to 
quickly recoup the damages (ibid.). In general, decentralization decreases the level of imme-
diate interdependency and consequently the degree of potential damage.  
Changes in media practices on the other hand, rest on the recognition that media and terrorism 
live in a certain “symbiosis” (Enders and Sandler 2006). On the one hand, a terrorist event is a 
welcome story to the media to report on and to boost sales; on the other hand, terrorists rely 
on the media to reach a large audience, beyond the directly affected victims of an attack, so as 
to instill fear in society. As the media determines the “cognitive experience” of terrorism by 
an audience larger than the directly affected victims, and magnifies the impact through con-
tinuous reporting of the topic (even at the expense of other topics) it plays an important role in 
“managing citizen” fears either positively or negatively (Kunreuther 2002). One potential 
counter-terrorism strategy in this connection is provided by Frey and Luechinger (2008). 
They argue that by providing the media with abounding information on terrorist attacks, the 
government may manipulate media recognition of terrorist groups; if the government achieves 
to conceal the true perpetrator of an attack (e.g., by not recognizing the true perpetrator al-
though it is known, thereby inducing free rider behavior of other groups), it may reduce the 
benefits of an attack that manifest in media attention, thus frustrating active terrorists. 
Empirically, Dreher and Fischer (2008) offer first support for the idea that decentralization is 
associated with a decreased likelihood of experiencing transnational terrorist attacks. Here, 
spending (fiscal) decentralization has a much stronger effect on terrorism than actual political 
decentralization. Interestingly (but in line with the previous argumentation), decentralization 
is not shown to produce security inefficiencies (as popular discourse may suggest); rather 
decentralization appears to generate a positive feedback between security means (decentrali-
zation) and insecurity. 
Considering the interactions between the media and terrorism, Nelson and Scott (1992) show 
that media coverage may induce additional terrorist acts. Similarly, Rohner and Frey (2007) 
show that media attention and terrorism share a bidirectional causality relationship, so in-
creased media attention granger-causes more terrorist events, and vice versa. These empirical 
findings indicate that by influencing media coverage of terrorist actions, terrorist activity may 
also be influenced. Still, existing evidence is rather sparse. Moreover, one can assume that 
terrorist organizations find their own ways of publicizing successful attacks, not least through 
the medium of the internet, which has become a popular terrorist platform. 
In summary, protective measures (decentralization, influencing media behavior) aim at reduc-
ing potential benefits of terrorist actions.45 Sparse empirical evidence shows that related poli-
cies (decentralization) may indeed yield positive effects. Nevertheless, no empirical study 
implicitly shows that a reduction of benefits from an attack is linked to a reduction of future 
attacks; this is particularly true for the interaction of the media and terrorism, where evidence 
                                                                          
45 Recently, Frey and Rohner (2007) advocated another counter-terrorism strategy that aims at decreasing 
potential terrorism benefits. They introduce a simple game-theoretic model to illustrate the interactions between 
protective government policies and terrorism. The model focuses on terrorist attacks on cultural monuments, 
which naturally yield a high payoff for terrorists, making them preferred terrorist targets. When the government 
shows determination to rebuild a monument (by means of public announcements, reconstruction plans etc.), it 
lowers the potential benefits of a terrorist attack. Instead of deterrence (active protection), reconstruction (or the 
commitment to it) is shown to be a cost-efficient defensive policy means. 
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has just uncovered their symbiotic relationship. There exists the possibility that protective 
measures lead to a change in terrorists’ behavior, so the effect of related counter-terrorism 
strategies is undermined. Even as such counter-terrorism strategies are successful in mitigat-
ing the effects of terrorist strikes, they may also induce a suite of substitution effects, which 
include a shift in targets, a change in the modes of attack, geographic transference between 
countries or in time. This implies that in order for related policies to be effective, they will 
need to address all possible modes of attacks, on all targets, in all possible countries, at all 
times. Given asymmetric information between terrorists and governments, this is hardly pos-
sible to achieve. This leads back to the question how to protect an economic system when the 
actual threats to security are unknown. 
 
5.2 Proactive  policies   
5.2.1 Targeting  terrorists’ infrastructure  
Proactive policies include measures such as employing intelligence and surveillance tech-
nologies to detect terrorist activity and capture perpetrators, the obstruction of terrorist finan-
cial flows and weapons supplies, as well as pre-emptive attacks. Beyond physical measures 
they can also include the tightening of legislation and curbing of citizen rights to increase 
difficulties for terrorists to organize, disseminate their information, recruit members, and so 
forth. In short, pre-emptive measures aim at starving terrorists of their (financial, human, 
physical, technological) resources, so as to disrupt their activities.  
The interception of terrorist financing has surely received most attention within the literature 
analyzing the dynamic repercussions of proactive terrorist measures. This is not only due to 
the dependence of terrorist organizations on financial assets to implement their activities but 
also due to the possibility of detecting terrorist activity by tracing the money trail in the sys-
tem. Yet, despite the potential elegancy of this approach, it is difficult to actually implement 
it. Firstly, to effectively freeze assets of terrorists, cooperation between states and the banking 
sector is required, which (given disincentives to disclose information on money transactions) 
has proven difficult to establish (FitzGerald 2004). Secondly, terrorists have shown to cir-
cumvent the freezing of their assets through diversifying their income sources, but also by 
blurring the traceability of their transactions (Schneider 2002; Napoleoni 2003; Alexiev 
2004). Al-Qaeda, the epitome of an elusive terrorist organization, receives money from 
sources ranging from private individuals to state sponsors, covered up as “development or-
ganizations” and “charities”. Further, they employ techniques of blurring the traces of their 
transactions similar to the ones of organized crime (Schneider 2002). As a result, stringent 
measures to severely reduce their assets are said to have failed. Enders and Sandler (2006) 
liken the activities to curb illicit money flows to a “leaking bucket”, whose success is at best 
temporary (cf. Addison and Murshed 2005) as terrorists find ways to circumvent regulations. 
What is more, when we think of terrorism as a “weapon of the poor”, meaning that the finan-
cial needs of terrorists are often argued to be comparatively small (cf. Sandler et al. 2009), a 
disruption of terrorist finance may be even more difficult to achieve. Interaction of Actors of Insecurities and Security  
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Apart from the failure to curb financial assets, the economics literature is pessimistic on the 
effectiveness of aggression to decrease human resources of terrorist organizations. The theory 
recognizes three channels through which proactive measures towards terror organizations 
could in fact aggravate terrorist behavior as response: firstly, aggression, specifically if it 
reduces freedoms of expression and therefore non-political means to express grievances will 
make non-terror activities relatively more costly, consequently leading to increased terrorist 
activity (Enders and Sandler 2006); secondly, aggression can fuel the legitimacy of terror 
organizations when their struggle for political rights is answered with a tightening of rights 
(Frey 2004); and thirdly, terror organizations may answer with a reorganization of their struc-
tures to evade aggression (Münkler 2004). Al-Qaeda again provides an example: the above 
mentioned elusiveness of this terror organization results from their success in decentralizing 
operations, which decreases the actual area of target and increases the independence of its 
functioning even if key leaders are caught (ibid).46 Enders and Sandler (2006) provide the 
case study of the bombing of Libya in 198647 to show how aggression against terrorism is 
answered with further aggression. Their findings show that this retaliatory raid caused an 
immediate increase to over 38 terrorist attacks per quarter, which subsequently fell, yet re-
mained at 12.7 incidents above the pre-intervention mean; that is, retaliation led to an increase 
rather than a reduction of terrorist attacks (Enders and Sandler 2006). Thus, coercive action 
towards terror organizations appears to result in a zero sum game which can potentially set of 
a spiral of violence – or as the literature concludes “deterrence may backfire” (Frey and 
Luechinger 2002). 
As alternatives to aggression, Frey and Luechinger (2003) and Frey (2004) suggest a few 
“carrots” to induce terrorists to refrain from terrorist activities. Such benevolent measures 
may include, e.g., mindful of legal reprisal that terrorists are likely to face when giving up 
their illegal actions. Rather than raising the costs of terrorist activities, it is called for a lower-
ing of the price when refraining from the latter. This could be achieved by, e.g., providing 
amnesty, re-socialization and political talks. Positive measures rather than inducing a zero or 
negative sum-game will at least in theory create a win-win situation where both sides (terror-
ist and the government) gain. Frey and Luechinger (2008) sum up some evidence suggesting 
that at least for Northern Ireland related policies (e.g., offering Sinn Fein as the IRA’s politi-
cal arm negotiations) were successful in reducing violent activities. Frey (2004) himself rec-
ognizes that his tactics may induce adverse incentives to terrorists, resulting in the exploita-
tion of positive measures and may be considered immoral, particularly by victims of terrorist 
attacks.48 
5.2.2  Targeting root causes of terrorism  
The last policy approach that remains to be discussed focuses on targeting the “root causes” 
of terrorism. While the above sections summarized counter-terrorism strategies that target the 
“permissive factors” (Drakos and Gofas 2006b), this section will discuss approaches that aim 
                                                                          
46 Ironically, al-Qaeda has therefore achieved what some economists (e.g., Frey 2004) advice governments to do 
in order to decrease their vulnerability. 
47 This refers to the US attack on targets in Libya in response to the (supposed) bomb attack of Libyan terrorists 
on a West Berlin night club April 5, 1986. 
48 This criticism has been voiced in a review of Frey (2004) by Inbar, E. (2006). "Book Review: Bruno S. Frey, 
Dealing with Terrorism—Stick or Carrot." European Journal of Political Economy 22(343-344). Interaction of Actors of Insecurities and Security  
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at eradicating the actual grievances on which terrorist actions are built, thus undermining 
terrorist legitimacy (e.g., recruitment, financing, popular support). In general, related strate-
gies are linked to an increase in the opportunity costs of violence (Frey and Luechinger 2008). 
If we assume that the IRA used violence because there was no other way to voice their dis-
sent, than offering them alternatives to violence (as discussed before) may also be considered  
as a way of targeting the roots of terrorism (here, the lack of representation) while similarly 
undermining terrorists’ legitimacy. In general, targeting the roots of terrorism means to make 
non-violence comparatively more attractive for potential terrorists or terrorist supporters, 
instead of increasing the costs of terrorism or decreasing its benefits. Clearly, such strategies 
require (i) to identify the “true” causes of terrorism and (ii) to alter related conditions through 
policy actions in ways that reduce terrorist activity. This discussion is closely linked to the 
one in Section 3. 
The main problem with targeting the root causes of terrorism is that existing evidence (espe-
cially when the analytical focus is global) does not deliver a clear result on which factors are 
actual roots of terrorism. What is more, different studies do not only stress the importance of 
different determinants (and thus advocate different policy solutions) but several studies also 
come to varying results with respect to the direction of influence of certain determinants.49 
The missing “one size fits all” result on terrorism causes makes any simple policy advice 
nearly impossible. 
Clearly, evidence from country studies may be used to formulate policy advice suitable for 
the very country analyzed. For instance, as the evidence by Feridun and Sezgin (2008) indi-
cates that economic underdevelopment encourages terrorism in Turkey, a sound policy advice 
is to foster economic development in this country. Still, it is unclear whether such strategies 
can be transferred to other countries. In any case, the analytical focus of the empirical analy-
ses should be kept in mind when deducing policy implications from them. 
Given that there is no “true” result on terrorism determinants, a number of (potentially) help-
ful counter-terrorism strategies can be thought of. Helpful strategies may include a reduction 
of economic, political (repression, inadequate representation etc.) and social (discrimination 
along ethnic or religious lines) underdevelopment. Also, political stabilization may work 
favorably in a reduction of terrorism. With respect to the empirical evidence on terrorism 
causes as presented in Section 3, an overall emphasis on political and institutional over eco-
nomic factors seems to be advised. 
On an international level, foreign aid (e.g., directed at sound education), assistance in eco-
nomic and political transformation and international cooperation (e.g., with regard to the 
organization of international trade) may also be helpful. As stressed before, all of these strate-
gies aim at making non-violence more attractive for potential terrorists and their supporters. 
However, several open questions remain. First, given that the empirics do not suggest a “true” 
root cause of terrorism, we cannot assess whether a certain strategy is helpful. Also, a strategy 
may be helpful but still constitute a waste of resources if other more effective ways of reduc-
ing terrorism exist (e.g. Sambanis, 2008). Second, the effectiveness of the suggested counter-
terrorism strategies is thus very much context-dependent. Third, evidence is inconclusive on 
                                                                          
49 As discussed before, there are studies arguing in favor of a “pure” (either autocratic or democratic) political 
regime to constrain terrorism, whereas other stress the role of repression in fostering terrorism and of democracy 
in reducing it. Interaction of Actors of Insecurities and Security  
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the interaction between various terrorism determinants and their links to terrorism. Such in-
teractions may require a more holistic policy approach (i.e., tackling different terrorism roots 
simultaneously when their interaction is found to independently impact on terrorism). 
In general, targeting the roots of terrorism may be effective when it makes non-violence more 
attractive and marginalizes terrorist groups. However, existing evidence does not allow for a 
clear strategy that is (globally) helpful in reducing terrorism. Consequently, this may lead to 
conflict mismanagement and a misallocation of resources. At the same time, targeting terror-
ism roots may be regarded as giving in to terrorists’ demands. As game theory shows, conces-
sions to terrorists may trigger new terrorist actions, may lead to changes in the structure of 
terrorist groups and other forms of adaption (e.g., Enders and Sandler 2006; Bolechow 2005). 
As terrorism has (from the point of view of terrorists) worked as an effective tool for bargain-
ing, a targeting of terrorism roots may thus be counter-productive and breed new (potentially 
more radical) terrorism. 
5.3  The determinants of the dynamics between security and 
insecurity  
By way of a simplified summary, defensive policies seem to incur substitution effects, chang-
ing the mode, target and timing of actual terrorist attacks, while proactive policies, whether 
benevolent or aggressive, whether tackling the symptoms or causes of terrorism appear to 
change the structure and organization of terror organizations. Overall, the theory and available 
data suggest that in fact, terrorism, even if it has not become more frequent, has already and 
will increasingly (i) become more severe, (ii) shift location towards places with relatively less 
security measures in place, such as the Middle East and Asia where it also encounters more 
ready support and (iii) has adapted its strategies and organizational structures to evade proac-
tive policies. Even though no statistical prove may be available for the latter, al-Qaeda pro-
vides an illustrative example how a terrorist organization can render a high security environ-
ment impotent.  
The literature predominantly suggests that the relative price of terrorist activities versus non-
terrorist activities constitutes the key determinant for terrorist responses to counter-terrorist 
measures. Yet, as the above section has shown, there are several other determinants which 
(although having received less attention) appear to be critical: 
First, the end of a policy, particularly the differentiation whether to protect targets, counter 
symptoms or actual root causes appears to be a factor in defining terrorist reactions to security 
measures. However, it is questionable whether the actual determinant is in fact the objective 
of the policy or rather the means employed to achieve these ends. 
Irrespective of the actual goal (e.g., democracy in Iraq), the tools employed to reach this goal 
have proven to trigger potentially strong (negative) reactions. Essentially, the literature identi-
fies negative repercussions from aggressive policies, and the possibility of a spiral of vio-
lence. Benevolence, in contrast, implies at least in theory a positive sum game or a win-win 
solution for both terrorists and targets (e.g., Anderton and Carter 2005). However, no empiri-
cal evidence exists that demonstrates this positive relation. Yet, at the most basic level, there 
is widespread agreement that terrorism requires economic and political but not military solu-
tions.  Interaction of Actors of Insecurities and Security  
  53
Ultimately, the responses to security measures are determined by the actual preferences of the 
terror agents themselves. The summary above has shown that the simple model of terrorism 
behavior may be correct in its essence (terrorists as rational agents). Yet, it is too simplistic 
and requires extension to fully account for all possible reactions.  
For instance, Addison and Murshed (2005) contend that the motivation of terrorists is impor-
tant to understanding reactions to response measures. In a simplified model, Addison and 
Murshed (2005) differentiate between degrees of militancy, suggesting that more militant 
terrorist members will be less easily deterred from violent means than less militant terrorists.50   
Applying this framework to different players of terror organizations, it is possible to differen-
tiate between three agents who are likely to differ in degrees of militancy and thus motivation:  
Terrorist leaders are likely to fall into the category of the more militant terrorist actors as 
understood by Addison and Murshed (2005). Consequently, unless their respective grievances 
are addressed, they will seek to circumvent security measures most ardently in favor of terror-
ist means. Their elasticity to substitute terrorism with non-violent action is likely to be small, 
if not zero or even negative.  
Terrorist recruits could have less militant motivations, i.e., they may be driven by other (e.g. 
economic) factors than merely political goals. Therefore, a price change in the possible alter-
natives may be more successful in changing their behavior.51 Thus, it is possible to hypothe-
size that their elasticity to substitute terrorism for non-terrorist actions is likely to be greater 
than zero. Within the group of terrorist recruits, Frey (2004) makes the important distinction 
between actual terrorists and potential future terrorists. While disincentives to choose terrorist 
activities have to be created for the latter, specific incentives for the first have to be created in 
order to enable them to renounce their violent behavior (ibid).  
Terrorist support groups are agents not directly involved in the actual planning and execution 
of terrorist acts but those who provide logistic support to terrorist organizations. As they often 
constitute the constituencies terrorists are fighting for, their support (and in reverse, a target-
ing to reduce their support) can be of significant importance. It is difficult to estimate their 
preferences but since they are not directly engaged in terrorist activities, their political objec-
tives could weigh less than other (e.g., economic) considerations. Therefore, it could be in-
ferred that their demand for non-terrorist actions is more price elastic. 
Furthermore, it may be helpful not only to look at the hierarchy of terrorist organizations to 
assess the effectiveness of counter-terrorism policies (and their interaction with terrorism) but 
also to look at individual organizations. As Blomberg et al. (2009) find, recidivist terrorist 
groups (running prolonged campaigns) are more likely to be influenced by socio-economic 
                                                                          
50 To illustrate this differentiation, while a more militant terrorist may have exclusively political objectives, a less 
militant actor may support the activities not only for political purposes but also for economic gain (through e.g. 
selling weapons, information, or other goods and services). With increased deterrence or alternative income 
opportunities, the latter may give up his political objectives in order not to jeopardise the economic gain. 
51 Abrahms (2008) argues that (rank-and-file) terrorists do not (primarily) join terrorist groups because of ideologi-
cal preferences but because they want to form or maintain social bonds (e.g., friendships).  In this case, offering 
alternatives to violence may be a poorer (less efficient) counter-terrorism strategy than an attack on these very 
social bonds (e.g., via an infiltration of a group and the spread of mistrust). Although Abrahms (2008) strongly 
argues against the standard rational choice framework (on which we rely here), it may nevertheless help to ex-
plain phenomena such as “unclaimed” terrorism (where no group takes responsibility) und terrorism in closed 
societies (in which terrorism does not gain publicity). See also Harrison (2009) for an empirical work on terrorism 
in the USSR as an example of the mechanics of terrorism and counter-terrorism in a closed society. Interaction of Actors of Insecurities and Security  
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and political factors than groups attacking only sporadically. This result may indicate that 
counter-terrorism focusing on an amelioration of terrorism root causes (to address the con-
cerns of terrorist groups) may be only effective once terrorists have started a prolonged cam-
paign. 
Given that terrorists not only form organizations but also more loose networks, e.g., as al-
Qaeda (e.g., Reuter 2004), an economic analysis of the issue of networks and terrorism may 
also be helpful to understand how such networks are run and how appropriate counter-
terrorism measures may look. Here, Siqueira and Sandler (2009) provide a recent analysis of 
this issue. Future research on this issue may help to design counter-terrorism measures appro-
priate for dealing with the threat of loose terrorist networks (in comparison to more “tradi-
tional” terrorist organizations). 
Lastly, the outcomes of the analysis of response reactions may also be influenced by the indi-
cators used to measure terrorist actions. Most knowledge on terrorist trends and patterns is 
based on data measuring the frequency and severity of terrorist attacks as the only indicator of 
change. However, it is impossible to conclude with certainty that a change in number and 
severity of attacks provides the best indicator for a change in terror activity. By contrast a 
prolonged period of time without a terror event does not necessarily mean the ceasing of ter-
ror activity; a large scale strike could be in preparation. In other words, impressions of the 
nature of change are limited to the available indicators, yet these may not be the most repre-
sentative for the real degree and nature of terror activity. 
 
 
6 ECONOMIC  EFFECTS  OF  ANTI-TERRORISM POLICY  
The economic impacts of anti-terror measures have been classified as the “indirect costs of 
terrorism” which result from the actions of both public and private agents to protect them-
selves against the impact of a terrorist attack or to prevent a terrorist attack (Brück 2006). 
Estimating these economic impacts requires accounting for direct effects, resulting from the 
expenditures invested in security measures and indirect impacts which derive from (i) the 
opportunity costs of these security investments and from (ii) dynamic effects of externalities 
and spillover effects. The economic impacts of security measures should further account for 
their actual impact on terror behavior or the effectiveness of the chosen security measures.  
Two broad classifications of security measures can be identified in the literature. Enders and 
Sandler (2006) differentiate between defensive and pro-active security measures: the former 
broadly concentrate on protecting targets from attacks or mitigating the impacts in case of 
attack; the latter concentrate on fighting the threat itself, i.e., target terrorists and terror or-
ganizations in an attempt to undermine their capacity and activities by reducing their resource 
base. As discussed earlier, both approaches aim at influencing the cost-benefit (and opportu-
nity cost) considerations of terrorist leaders, active terrorists and terrorist supporters.  
Frey (2004) classifies security measures not with respect to their object of focus (targets ver-
sus terrorists) but rather with regard to the adopted approach. He identifies “deterrence” in Economic Effects of Anti-Terrorism Policy  
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contrast to “positive” or benevolent measures.52 The first strategy incorporates both “physi-
cal” as well as legal measures aiming to deter terrorists from their activities; the second points 
towards measures that create incentives which induce terrorists to replace their acts of politi-
cal violence with non-violent means. 
Importantly, these classifications are not mutually exclusive, i.e., they do not provide alterna-
tive but complementary classifications, as illustrated in Table 2 below.  
 
Table 2: Classification of different types of counter-terror measures 
  Defensive policies  Pro-active policies 
Deterrence policies / 
negative incentives  
Increasing the costs of terror 
e.g., surveillance and protection 
of targets 
Decreasing resource endowments 
of terror organizations  
e.g., intelligence and military 
operations 
Benevolent policies / 
positive incentives  
Decreasing the benefits derived 
e.g., decentralization of targets, 
decreasing media attention  
Increasing opportunity costs of 
terrorism  
e.g., tackling grievances /root 
causes of terrorism, re-
socialization 
 
In practice, “defensive policies” entail direct actions (such as investments in security tech-
nologies) and indirect actions including changes in consumption, investment and saving pat-
terns to avoid exposure to risk situations. 
“Pro-active policies” incorporate all measures that aim to undermine terrorist activity, directly 
through interrupting their supply of resources including financial assets, arms, recruits etc; 
measures can range from intelligence operations, to military strikes (e.g., Iraq and Afghani-
stan) (Enders and Sandler 2006). 
Within these two broad categories, it is possible to identify two sub-categories: defensive 
measures can be differentiated whether they protect singular identified targets (i.e., raise the 
costs of terrorism) or whether they attempt to mitigate the impacts of an actual terrorist attack 
(i.e., decrease the benefits of terrorist strikes); pro-active measures can be differentiated 
whether they merely target the symptoms (i.e., inducing cost and benefit effects) or the root 
causes of terrorism (i.e., increase the opportunity costs of terrorism). 
The economic literature explains the choice of counter-terrorism measures (especially in the 
case of transnational terrorism) mainly by the public-private good nature of security. Defen-
sive policies are largely a private good, where benefits of security provision are mostly inter-
nalized by the investor, while pro-active policies exhibit characteristics of a public good 
(Sandler and Siqueira 2006). Game-theoretic approaches show that, given the absence of 
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coordination mechanisms that make all to take proactive measures, countries will be better off 
to take defensive measures and free ride on the pro-active measures of others in the case of 
transnational terrorism. This consequently may lead to an oversupply of defensive and an 
undersupply of pro-active measures.  
The public-private good nature of security provision increases the need for cooperation at the 
international level between countries, and at national level between the private and public 
sector. The main obstacle is to overcome persistent coordination failures between different 
agents. Sandler and Siqueira (2006) conclude that leadership is apt to lessen inefficiency in 
providing defensive measures, yet fails to improve efficiency for pre-emptive measures. 
When considering the factors that induce or prevent cooperation to enhance security, situa-
tions of (international) under- and over-supply of security (i.e., counter-terrorism measures) 
should not be overlooked, providing further needs for international coordination (cf. Sandler 
and Lapan 1988). Considering an under-supply of security, some states (often so-called 
“failed” states) are known to tolerate the activities of terrorist organizations in their territory 
in exchange for no direct harm at the expense of other nations, which is referred to as “paid 
riding” by Lee (1988) and Lee and Sandler (1988). In the case of over-supply of counter-
terrorism in a country, terrorist attacks may be diverted to less protected areas (cf. Enders and 
Sandler 2006). These two phenomena make multilateral cooperation even more important, 
yet, as practice shows, not easier (Enders and Sandler 2006). 
In the following, we want to discuss existing theoretical and empirical studies that analyze the 
economic effects of counter-terrorism policies at (i) the micro level, (ii) across industry sec-
tors, (iii) the macro level and (iv) a global level. We also want to briefly discuss the political 
effects of counter-terrorism policies. 
6.1  Micro-economic impacts  
Just as in Section 4, the underlying micro-economic processes are explained before the aggre-
gate impacts at the macro level are discussed. At micro-economic levels, security measures of 
economic agents can include direct expenditures on security technologies or indirect changes 
in consumption and investment behavior to hedge against the risk of falling victim to an at-
tack. In addition, dynamic impacts of these changed consumption and investment patterns 
have to be accounted for. 
6.1.1  Security measures of consumers and households 
Sound research on measures of households to enhance levels of security hardly exists, even 
after 9/11. Consequently, not much more information is available than anecdotal evidence, 
such as accounts of panic purchases of antibiotics following the anthrax scares in the US in 
2001. In contrast, a few localized studies (cf. West and Orr 2005) suggest that the American 
public’s security measures are far less drastic than related anecdotes suggest. For example, a 
2004 New York Times national survey revealed that households have hardly taken action to 
prepare themselves against a terrorist attack: 61% of the respondents had not put together an 
emergency food kit with water, and 70% stated that they had not chosen a family meeting 
place or communications plan in the event of an attack (in West and Orr 2005). Economic Effects of Anti-Terrorism Policy  
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However, even if there is little actual investment in security equipment, consumption and 
savings preferences are influenced by security considerations.53 These changes in demand 
patterns due to risk aversion become visible in the impacts on different sectors of the econ-
omy, some of which (as we will discuss later) have suffered substantial losses due to fear of 
terrorism. As an important policy conclusion, Drakos and Kutan (2003) point out that state aid 
to companies suffering from adjustments in consumer demand due to terrorism will be futile 
in cases where demand has permanently changed. 
6.1.2  Security measures of the private sector  
The available options of security measures of companies are very similar to households: in-
vestment in security equipment and technologies, and management decisions to hedge against 
the risk of a terrorist attack, reflected e.g. in investment decisions. In theory, companies that 
face direct threats from terrorism have to incur expenses for security technology, insurance 
cover and often have to pay a risk premium to their employees in the form of higher wages 
and salaries; actual quantities depend on the nature of the threat and the respective sector.  
The underlying factor that drives security spending arises from a company’s and its manag-
ers’ degree of risk aversion. Both the academic and practical literature agrees that risk aver-
sion and the willingness to accept risk vary markedly across time, space but especially be-
tween individual managers. A study by Ryans and Shanklin (1980) shows that in 1980, 82 top 
international officials from US and overseas multinationals ranked terrorism as a key barrier 
to investment. In contrast, PricewaterhouseCoopers 10th Annual Global CEO Survey in 2006 
(PricewaterhouseCooper 2007) concludes that CEOs (even after the unprecedented attacks of 
9/11) are less worried about unforeseen shocks such as terrorism or natural disasters but rather 
about an overregulation of the economy.54 The report further highlights how degrees of risk 
perceptions differ across individual CEOs, across geographic areas and with respect to eco-
nomic conditions. Michel-Kerjan and Pedell (2006) arrive at similar conclusions regarding the 
perceived risk of terrorism in a study which compares the up-take of terrorism insurance 
cover in Germany and the US in the years after the introduction of the respective terrorism 
risk insurance acts. On the one hand, they argue that a suite of factors other than an actually 
heightened sense of insecurity55 account for the increased up-take of terrorism risk insurance; 
on the other, they provide data from a US Treasury Survey, which finds that 90% of respon-
dents to a US Treasure survey that did not purchase terrorism insurance believe “it will not 
happen to them”. 
Consistent with this low risk perception, McKinsey (2006) finds that only three out of ten 
respondents report that their companies have taken active steps to prepare for any one of the 
following scenarios that could harm virtually any company: a pandemic, a natural disaster or 
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are more worried about negative impacts of counter-terrorism measures involving security regulations on their 
businesses than about terrorism itself. 
55 These factors include regulatory measures, reduced prices for terrorist coverage and greater concern about 
possible liability under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, should executives be deemed to have failed to protect corporate 
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increased geopolitical instability, such as terrorism.56 In a similar vein, PricewaterhouseCoop-
ers 10th Annual CEO survey shows that “of all the threats, availability of key skills and low-
cost competition are the two that companies are addressing with significant resources”, 
whereas terrorism does not induce significant spending (PricewaterhouseCooper 2007). Both 
studies offer support for Suder's (2004) main argument, who points to the necessity to incor-
porate geo-political risk (including terrorism) into risk assessment strategies.  
Higher levels of risk further impact investment not only due to a change in allocation of re-
sources but also due to an aversion to commit to new projects due to uncertainty (Brück 
2006). Yet, Purnell and Wainstein (1981) conclude that at least in the case of US businesses, 
neither the costs of terrorism nor the consequent costs of security measures seem to signifi-
cantly impact profitability that US businesses would pull out of countries affected by terror-
ism. Yet, aggregate patterns of investment flows contradict this optimistic conclusion as will 
be shown below.  
The limited concern about terrorism is not surprising, given that only specific sectors are 
likely to face a direct threat, and given that indirect terrorist threats work through other chan-
nels, i.e. changes in demand, disruption in supply chains and other operation risks. In other 
words, terrorism is likely to be addressed within other risk factors. But even if terrorism is 
addressed within these wider sets of risks, Buehler and Pritsch (2003) suggest that the corpo-
rate meltdowns of recent years show that many companies neither manage risk well nor fully 
understand the risks they are taking. 
A potentially even more important reason for the lack of security measures could derive from 
the complexity to manage terrorism risk which arises from several factors such as the interde-
pendent security environment in which businesses are located; the elusive threat and dynamic 
uncertainty created by terrorism; and the significance of government actions to increase or 
decrease the threat level that businesses face. Especially the first and third point create large 
disincentives to security investments, as the effectiveness of protection against terrorism is 
dependent on the level of protection of the weakest link; thus, investment by one company 
does not necessarily mean an actually enhanced level of security if other companies or gov-
ernment fail to cooperate. 
In conclusion, it is necessary to ask whether businesses’ little security investments are justi-
fied, given the low probability nature of terrorist events, or whether they are in fact under-
investing at the possible expense not only of their operations but also society at large, given 
that a terrorist attack can incur costs that stretch far beyond companies’ boundaries (as 9/11 
and other events have shown). These interdependencies give rise to the debate about public-
private partnerships to overcome coordination failures between companies to ensure adequate 
security standards in industries. As the rest of this section will show, regulations can have 
significant repercussions on economic competitiveness, leading back to the above mentioned 
trade-off between scaling down on efficiency expectations and enhancing the security of the 
overall system. 
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representative sample of business executives, 44 percent of whom are CEOs or other C-level executives. Ranked 
according to importance, the three most important risks against which companies prepare are major regulatory 
changes (58%); substantial changes in currencies, interest rates or inflation; and a global or regional slow down. 
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6.1.3  Security measures at government level 
While private agents’ activities are mainly focused on enhancing their own level of security 
through protective measures, governments face the responsibility to allocate their available 
resources between defensive and pro-active measures.57 The choice between the two is criti-
cal, especially regarding their actual impact on enhancing the security level of a country.58 
Enders and Sandler (2006) find that there is a proclivity to favor defensive counter-terrorist 
measures over pro-active ones, which will result in equilibrium with socially inferior payoffs 
when compared with pro-active responses. Pro-active policies tend to provide purely public 
benefits to all potential targets and are usually undersupplied, whereas defensive policies tend 
to yield a strong share of provider-specific benefits and are often oversupplied. The reaction 
to 9/11 has been a mix of defensive measures (e.g., security regulations at borders and trans-
port hubs) and pro-active ones (the global pursuit of terrorists). Yet, while governments 
shoulder the costs of pro-active measures, it is the private sector and households who appear 
to be carrying much of the burden of e.g. regulatory protection measures by government. It 
has been estimated that the private sector will face about US$ 10 billion a year due to US 
homeland security measures, although initially they could be much higher, i.e. in the range of 
US$ 46 billion to US$ 76 billion (Stevens 2003). Thus, governments’ regulatory measures to 
enhance security can have significant impacts on the economy. 
This leads to the question of appropriate government involvement in security provision. In 
this respect, the case of security provision in the aviation sector provides an illustrative exam-
ple: The fact that security at one airport can affect the well-being of those at other airports 
provides an economic justification for governmental involvement in aviation security 
(Coughlin et al. 2002). A fundamental question is whether the role of the state should be re-
stricted to setting and monitoring security standards or whether its role should also include the 
financing and implementation of security. In the US, in a controversial change the federal 
government has assumed responsibility for the actual provision of aviation security. Propo-
nents of this change argue that (relative to private provision) public security provision reduces 
the incentives to reduce quality through cost reductions. Still, a public agency may not pro-
vide security services efficiently as it operates in a monopolistic way. Furthermore, a public 
agency may provide an excessive amount of security, thus incurring unnecessary expenses 
because it is likely to be judged on its security record and not on all the attributes encom-
passed by air transportation services for consumers. Thus, economic theory does not provide a 
clear answer to what is likely to be a continuing source of controversy - the appropriate scope 
of governmental involvement in aviation security. 
6.2  Impacts across sectors 
Congruently to the varying degree to which sectors are affected by direct effects of terrorism, 
the economic repercussions of security measures impact various sectors in different ways. 
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security measures (Harrison 2006b). Fostering civilian intervention (through government policies) may be another 
way of countering terrorism, producing distinct costs and benefits.  
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Those sectors facing direct risks of terrorism are bound to incur the most costs to protect 
themselves against an attack. Particularly, the transport industry has invested large amounts 
into enhanced security.59 While terrorist attacks on transport and infrastructure have happened 
in the past, it was 9/11 which induced major increases in security measures to be applied 
across the entire transport sector (aviation, maritime transport, road and rail).  
The aviation industry surely was the sector strongest hit by security measures, firstly due to 
stringent security regulations introduced after 9/11, and secondly due to severe drops in de-
mand in cargo as well as passenger traffic due to risk averse customers.60 Since 9/11 it has 
been estimated that airlines have spent US$ 43 billion on security measures, including more 
thorough baggage checks, greater in-flight inspection and new regulations for secure cockpit 
doors (World Bank 2003, in DFAT 2004).61 In the US, the US Aviation and Transportation 
Security Act of 2001 estimated the cost for the federal government at around US$ 9.3 be-
tween 2002 and 2009. Airport operator’s additional costs are expected to be around US$ 56 
million annually (Coughlin et al. 2002). Some of these costs have been shifted to customers: 
in response to the enhanced security, many airlines have started to add “security surcharges”, 
resulting in fee increases of up to US$ 8 per person or within the range of US$ 0.10 to 0.15 
per kg of cargo (Walkenhorst and Dihel 2002). The findings of Blalock et al. (2007) in this 
connection show that the implementation of baggage screening in the US after 9/11 has led to 
a considerable reduction in demand for air travel, even after controlling for other effects 
which may have simultaneously affected travel demand. That is, the study shows that counter-
terrorism measures actually worsened the situation of an industry sector already hit by terror-
ism; the findings imply a trade-off between security (baggage screening) and industry profit-
ability. 
In the shipping industry, a series of measures aimed at strengthening maritime security have 
been adopted by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) which includes e.g. the Inter-
national Ship and Port Facility Code (ISPS) in December 2002. The costs of implementing 
the ISPS to ship operators (including the installing of security equipment) has been estimated 
to reach US$ 1.3 billion and ongoing operating cost of around US730 million annually. Sys-
tem wide procedural changes, though difficult to account for, have been estimated to amount 
to US$ 282 million. The overall costs of those transport counter-terrorism measures were 
estimated in 2003 to amount to over US$ 2 billion (in DFAT 2004).  
Yet, increased security may not only incur negative impacts. At least in the case of the finan-
cial sector, the introduction of tighter monitoring of financial transactions seems to have had 
some positive returns. A survey on Anti-Money Laundering (AML) initiatives in the banking 
and financial sector implemented by PricewaterhouseCooper (2005) shows that AML initia-
tives are seen to contribute to improve competitiveness in the long run; still, they may  disad-
vantage those countries with more stringent requirements if implemented unevenly across 
countries. Even as AML initiatives are one of the biggest drivers of increased compliance 
costs in the Western hemisphere and as smaller banks are beginning to feel the pressure and 
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complain about this new regulatory burden, the industry in general believes that the approach 
is justified within the current (in-) security environment and the role of financial flows.  
In general, security investments could contribute to improving efficiency and effectiveness of 
specific sectors and the economy as a whole, especially where security against terrorism can 
be coupled with general security issues (DFAT 2004). Yet, so far no analysis exists that dem-
onstrates potential positive impacts of enhanced security on overall operations.  
Apart from the direct costs that sectors incur to protect themselves and society against terror-
ism, changes in demand and consumption patterns, arising out of security concerns of clients 
and customers as discussed above may have significant impacts on those sectors, through 
which customers face a direct risk of terrorism.  
This includes the transport sector, and specifically the aviation industry which has received 
most attention in the literature. Airlines had already been facing difficulties before 9/11; the 
subsequent drops in demand which hit particularly American airlines led to estimated losses 
for IATA members of US$ 15 billion in 2001 (Drakos 2004) and an additional aggregate loss 
of US$ 12 billion in 2002. Boeing Commercial Airplanes announced a 30,000 manpower 
reduction (Hooke 2006). It is noteworthy, that the low-cost sector did not suffer from this 
decline: Southwest, jetBlue in the US and Ryanair and Easyjet in Europe did not only grow 
but were among the few to record profits.  
Tourism is another sector which suffers significantly from changes in demand due to risk 
aversion. Either it will suffer from terrorism as a response to increased security measures or 
increased (perceived) vulnerability. Table 3 gives an overview of the effects of terrorism on 
tourism in affected countries. We discuss these studies (and others) in more detail below. 
 
 
Table 3: Some Evidence on the Impact of Terrorism on Tourism 
Study  Analytical Scope  Main Results 
Enders and 
Sandler (1991) 
Spain, Monthly Data 
1970-1988 
Terrorism negatively affects the number of 
visitors of Spain (tourists). There is no 
evidence of reverse causation. 
Enders et al. 
(1992) 
Greece, Italy and Austria, 
Quarterly Data 1974-1988 
Greece, Italy and Austria suffered severe 
revenue losses from tourism as a conse-
quence of terrorism. 
Fleischer and 
Buccola (2002) 
Israel,  1987-1999  Foreign tourism is sensitive to terrorism, 
while domestic terrorism is not. Shifts from 
foreign to domestic terrorism in the face of 
terrorism cannot compensate for losses due 





Terrorism works as “bad advertisement”, 
making tourism in targeted countries less 
attractive. This effect is stronger for devel-




Egypt and Israel, 1955-
1997 and 1971-1997 
While terrorism (along with instability and 
external war) negatively affect tourism 
flows, the tourism sector remains important 
as tourism flows are able to recuperate after 
negative shocks.  
Pizam and 
Fleischer (2002) 
Israel, Monthly Data 1991-
2001 
A high frequency of terrorism is more 
dangerous to tourism flows than the sever-
ity of these attacks. 
Drakos and Ku-
tan (2003) 
Greece, Italy and Turkey, 
Monthly Data 1991-2000 
Terrorism reduces tourist arrivals, reducing 
market shares of targeted countries. Terror-
ism also produces regional spill-over ef-
fects, making tourism in a “terrorism in-
fected” region generally less attractive. 
 
For Spain, which has not only suffered from ETA but also other (mostly left-wing) terrorist 
groups, it has been estimated that a typical terrorist act scares away over 140,000 visitors, 
combining all monthly impacts (Enders and Sandler 1991). Enders et al. (1992) estimate the 
actual losses in tourism revenue for Austria, Italy and Greece to amount to US$ 4.538 billion, 
US$ 1.159 billion and US$ 0.77 billion, respectively, between 1974 and 1988.62 For the same 
period, continental Europe as a whole lost US$ 16.145 billion due to terrorism (total tourist 
revenues in 1988 were US$ 74.401 billion).63 This highlights the significance in tourism 
losses but also the variability of losses across countries. While Austria, Greece and continen-
tal Europe in general lost substantial portions of their revenues (40%, 23% and 21%, respec-
tively), the losses in Italy amounted “only” to 6%. Negative relations between terrorism and 
tourist demand have also been observed in other countries, including Israel and Turkey. 
Fleischer and Buccola (2002) estimating a supply and demand model of the Israeli hotel in-
dustry between 1992 and 1998, calculate a 1.27% loss of total revenues over this period, 
which rises with a deterioration of the situation. That is, evidence in general shows that terror-
ism negatively affects the tourism industry because tourists factor in terrorism as a risk when 
planning their holidays. The findings of Llorca-Vivero (2008) add to this view as the study 
shows that both domestic and transnational terrorist attacks enter a tourist’s calculus when 
making traveling choices. 
Not only impacts but also the immediacy with which these impacts come into effect seem to 
vary strongly: while Enders and Sandler (1991) and Fleischer and Buccola (2002) find rela-
tively immediate effects of terrorism on tourism, i.e. after two to three months for Spain and 
Israel respectively, Enders et al. (1992) find a ¾ lag before terrorism affects tourism in 
Greece, while tourism remains unaffected by a terrorist incident until a full 18 to 21 months 
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in these countries in 1988 amounted to $11.149 billion, $19.311 billion and $3.29 billion respectively. Note that 
we, inter alia, draw on information from Frey and Luechinger (2005) and Frey et al. (2007) when discussing the 
links between terrorism and tourism in this subsection. 
63 Note the methodological difficult to find an appropriate counterfactual: not the number of tourists before the 
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afterwards in the case of continental Europe and Austria respectively. Frey and Luechinger 
(2005) explain these variations with the differences in the structure of terror campaigns not 
just across countries but also across time. Differences in time lags could further stem from 
differences in booking systems, where existing bookings are kept while changes only become 
apparent in the number of new bookings.  
Even if impacts are significant, research shows that these effects are transitory. Yet, empirical 
research provides no unambiguous conclusion regarding the relationship between continued 
attacks and permanency of impacts: Aly and Strazicich (2000) studying annual bed nights in 
Egypt and Israel conclude that the impacts on the tourism sector remain transitory despite 
continued acts of terror and regional instability. Pizam and Fleischer (2002) in contrast, focus-
ing on Israel argue that the tourist industry can recover even from severe acts of terrorism as 
long as the terrorist acts are not repeated. Thus, when acts of terrorism (whether of high or 
low severity) occur at high frequency and regular intervals, tourism demand will constantly 
decrease, and eventually the destination's tourism industry will come to a standstill. It is inter-
esting to note that the frequency of attacks seems to influence tourism, while the severity of 
an attack seems not to influence tourism demand.  
A second effect which has been researched is trans-boundary impacts of terrorism on other 
tourist destinations, especially neighboring countries. Of importance here is Drakos and Ku-
tan's (2003) study on spillover and contagion effects. Using monthly data for the period 1991 
to 2000, they investigate the effect of terrorism in Greece, Israel and Turkey on each other’s 
market share, with Italy serving as a control country, representing the rest of the Mediterra-
nean region. They find significant substitution effects and also empirical evidence for conta-
gion effects. Only around 11% of aggregate losses in market shares are directed towards other 
destinations within the group of countries under consideration, whereas around 89% flow out 
into safer regions (in Frey et al. 2007). This demonstrates the necessity to understand fears of 
tourists to base strategic and operational marketing strategies on them (Dolnicar 2005). 
Yet, even sectors that are not directly targeted by terrorism can be negatively affected by 
security measures. As shown above, some of the costs of security investments in the transport 
sector have been passed on to clients rather than having been fully internalized by the compa-
nies themselves. Consequently, trading sectors relying on their services will face increased 
costs not in the form of higher transport fees but also in the form of longer transport durations 
and delays as will be shown in the section   below.  
In contrast to these negative repercussions, those sectors providing security technologies and 
services, namely the defence and security industries64, benefit from investments into security 
technologies. The military response to the attacks of 9/11 reversed the declining trend in mili-
tary expenditure which had set in with the end of the Cold War. According to the Stockholm 
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However, there are also differences. For instance, the defence industry supplies the armed forces, while the 
security industry supplies public police forces and also private security firms. Given that “modern” forms of war-
fare (e.g., fight against guerrillas or terrorist networks) does not demand for large armed forces but new methods 
of military operations, some convergence between the defence and security sectors (e.g., with respect to products 
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mind that defence expenditures are generally expected to be looser connected to terrorism than government 
spending on policing or intelligence. That is, it is unclear to what extent increases or decreases in defence spend-
ing actually affect the fight against terrorism (or are affected by it). Given that data (and literature) on defence 
spending is more available, we nevertheless report related findings and discussions, always keeping the previous 
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International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), global military spending increased by 18% 
between beginning of 2002 and the end of 2003, with the US, Japan, UK, France and China 
accounting for 64% of the world market (note that the US alone spends 47% of the global 
total). Yet, one may not expect this increase to last, apart from the expenditure increase in the 
US where defence spending has increased by over 60% in the past ten years, amongst others 
for the reason of combating global terrorism. Further, given new characteristics of security 
challenges, particularly embodied in asymmetric warfare against a clandestine enemy, mili-
tary expenditure is now demanding more flexible, responsive and mobile forces. Thus, the 
military industry will have to adjust its products and services in order to realize this increased 
demand. 
The security industry in contrast appears to experience sustainable growth. Available esti-
mates put the private security industry’s turnover at between US$ 100 billion and US$ 120 
billion worldwide.65 The largest share is accounted for by the US, although other OECD 
countries have sizeable security industries as well. For example, Germany’s is estimated to be 
around US$ 4 billion and France’s and the United Kingdom’s around US$ 3 billion (Stevens 
2003).  There is little evidence within the industry of a major upsurge in spending on security 
since 9/11. However, longer-term data suggest healthy growth in turnover in the order of 7-
8% p.a., easily outstripping average annual economic growth rates. Prospects for some seg-
ments, including biometrics, radio frequency identification (RFID) technologies and computer 
security are particularly favorable (ibid). But terrorism is not the sole driver of the security 
industry; an increasing trend in organized crime, perceptions of increased personal insecurity 
and the characteristics of the global economic system which make protection more necessary 
spur the growth of the security industry, so not all growth effects can be attributed to terror-
ism. 
In conclusion, it appears that in the short run the military industry benefited greatly from the 
first reactions to 9/11 while in the long run, it will be the security industry that will profit 
mostly from the new insecurity environment that is posed not just by terrorism but various 
other forms of human induced insecurity. Other industries will continue to suffer from terror. 
The tourism industry is one example, as it may either suffer from terrorism as a response to 
increased security measures or increased (perceived) vulnerability. However, due to substitu-
tion effects (cf. Drakos and Kutan 2003) the loss of on country’s tourism sector may be an-
other country’s tourism sector gain. That is, it may be meaningful to analyze the effects of 
terrorism on certain industry sectors from an international perspective as well.  
6.3  Macro-economic impacts  
Ultimately, micro-economic processes and behavior translate into macro-economic impacts 
which are reflected in various variables. Just as at micro-economic level, it is necessary to 
account for a) the direct results from increased spending in security measures, which translate 
into fiscal effects, and effects on aggregate consumption and investment; b) for the indirect 
impacts, which result from the security measures taken, reflected in e.g. increased transaction 
costs and repercussions on the competitiveness of the economy and c) the aggregate impacts 
                                                                          
65 It is necessary to point to the difficulties to measure the value added of the security industry and spending on 
security mainly due to data but also accounting problems, and therefore the figures are merely an attempt to 
provide a some dimensions of this still somewhat elusive sector. Economic Effects of Anti-Terrorism Policy  
  65
of changes in consumption and investment spending which do not result from direct security 
investments but rather from risk aversion. 
6.3.1  Fiscal effects  
In theory, a negative shock such as a terrorist event is expected to incur an increase in public 
security spending (Brück 2006), with the potential effect of retarding long-term growth as 
high budgets for defence and homeland security may crowd out more growth-enhancing in-
vestments; moreover, there is some evidence that public security spending may also crowd 
out potentially more efficient private sector attempts to increase security. In fact, Stevens 
(2003) finds that governments and other public authorities have increased their overall spend-
ing on security, in some cases quite substantially. The US Homeland Security budget doubled 
from fiscal year 2002/03 to its current level (2004) of well over US$ 30 billion: funding for 
aviation security is now running at US$ 4.8 billion and for border security at US$ 10.6 billion. 
Stevens (2003) concludes that such investments are funded by government taxes or private 
spending. Consequently, even if this will not incur significant budgetary impacts, economic 
impacts will still be significant.  
Gupta et al. (2004) who analyze the changes in composition of public spending in low and 
middle income countries show that terror and armed conflict may lead to increases in defence 
spending, resulting in a negative impact of public spending on social and economic issues. 
Thus, they show that the fiscal effects of defence and security spending in medium and low-
income countries can have a significantly negative fiscal impact, consequently reducing future 
economic growth. 
6.3.2 Growth 
Related to the fiscal impacts of security spending but more complex is the relation between 
security spending and growth. A large body of literature exists discussing the effects of de-
fence expenditures on economic growth (Ram 1995; Cohen et al. 2003; Lee and Chang 2006) 
and analyzing potential spill-over effects of defence R&D for the economy (Lerner 1992; 
Cowan 1995; Lichtenberg 1995; Trajtenberg 2004). Yet, this literature does not identify a 
straightforward relation between the defence expenditures and growth. Various studies show 
that the defence-growth relationships can take many forms: defence spending can have a 
lagged effect on growth. It may even spur growth in the short run, while constraining it in the 
long run, or vice versa. Rather than directly, defence spending may influence the economy 
through indirect channels. In fact, the causality may even be reversed, so economic develop-
ment may also influence defence spending. Cohen et al. (2003) provide a more nuanced 
analysis differentiating between short- and long-term effects, and between direct and indirect 
impacts, thus providing a more cautious conclusion about both the impacts of defence expen-
diture on the one hand, as well as the impacts of the so called “peace dividend”.66 
In contrast to the extensive literature on defence-growth relationships outlined above, hardly 
any literature exists on the impacts that terror security spending will have on economic 
growth. Baily (2001) concludes that (provided fiscal discipline prevails) there is no reason to 
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fear that long-run growth is compromised for higher security. Rather than expecting negative 
effects from increased security spending, he alludes to the potential negative effects of a re-
versal of the current state of liberalization. Baily’s argument accords to Hobijn's (2003) asser-
tion that neither private nor public security spending will have a major impact on the US 
economy, estimating that private security spending will reduce labor productivity by only 
1.12% and multifactor productivity by only 0.65%, resulting in only small aggregate results 
on US GDP. Regarding public security spending, he calculates that homeland security spend-
ing will reduce output only by 0.6 % over a five-year period. Judging by the much larger scale 
of military spending in the 1980s, he believes that to be negligible, also having no effect on 
the US budget deficit. Lenain et al. (2002) estimate that security spending leads to a reduction 
in real GDP by about 0.7 % after five years.  
However, these results are thought to be too optimistic (Brück 2006). In addition, they were 
made shortly after the 9/11 attacks when the full extent of counter-terrorism measures could 
not be known. Therefore, it is necessary to treat these conclusions with caution. Furthermore, 
these estimates only refer to security spending in the US, i.e., a large and well-developed 
economy with an annual GDP of over US$ 13 trillion. It is possible that security spending 
could have a significantly retarding effect on economic growth in small and less developed 
economies (Gupta et al. 2004). 
6.3.3 Trade 
The literature pays specific attention to the negative impacts of slowed down transport and 
trade flows due to heightened security measures at borders and transport hubs (Brück 2006). 
These “frictional costs” of trade arise not only from delays at transport hubs and border con-
trols but also from increased insurance charges and prices for security measures which are 
passed on from operators to clients (e.g., Nitsch and Schumacher 2004). In quantitative terms 
it has been estimated that a one-day delay due to border controls costs 0.5% of the value of 
the delayed good (Hummels 2002). Leonard (2001) estimates rising trading costs of 1% to 3% 
ad valorem after 9/11.67 This increase corresponds to an annual increase in production costs of 
traded goods of US$ 5.6 billion to US$ 16.8 billion (Walkenhorst and Dihel 2002). Ulti-
mately, with an estimated elasticity of trade flows (in volume terms) with respect to transport 
costs (ad valorem) of -2 to -3.5, Limao and Venables (2001) expect trade to reduce by this 
factor.68  It is necessary to note that these impacts on trading costs and subsequently trading 
volumes will vary across goods as well as across trading countries: goods with a high value to 
weight ratio whose share of trading costs already before 9/11 had a lower proportion of the 
value (e.g., pharmaceuticals) are expected to be less affected than goods with a low value to 
weight ratio (Walkenhorst and Dihel 2002). 
In 2001/2002, when these studies were implemented, authors such as Walkenhorst and Dihel 
(2002) expected security measures to abate over time, with an enhanced perception of security 
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in the transport and trade sector, yet, given continued attempts to attack infrastructure, costs in 
fact are likely to have increased.  
Yet, not all studies see increased investments in security necessarily in a negative light. For 
example, Mirza and Verdier (2008) point to the two-way relationship between terrorism and 
trade openness, which implies that the relative costs and benefits of openness in relation to 
terrorism69 have to be carefully assessed against the costs of enhanced security measures. 
6.3.4 Investment   
Macro-economic impacts of security measures may also result from changes in investment 
behavior due to increased risk aversion. Ryans and Shanklin (1980) in their study of 82 ex-
ecutives of leading multinationals in the US show that a firm’s decision to expose itself to the 
risk of terrorism in a host country will be determined by the returns on the investment, which 
must be considerably greater than under normal conditions. Thus, high returns on investment 
are likely to be the reason for Purnell and Wainstein’s (1981) finding that despite potential 
difficulties businesses will not pull out of a country but rather cope with terrorist threats or 
attacks as with other acts of violence.70 
Yet, in contrast to the relative manageability of terrorism that these micro-analyses suggest, 
aggregate studies are more pessimistic about the relation between terrorism and capital flows. 
For Spain and Greece Enders and Sandler (1996) find that protracted political insecurity 
through terrorism will have significant negative impacts on foreign investment inflows. Capi-
tal inflows to Spain deceased by 13.5% on average over the period 1968 to 1991; Greece 
which was plagued by two major terrorist organizations in the same time period, experienced 
a comparable reduction of direct foreign investment averaging 11.9% annually.71 
At a cross-country level, Blomberg and Mody (2005) estimate the quantitative implications of 
violence on international investment. Three findings emerge from their analysis: firstly, vio-
lence at home tends to move investment abroad; secondly, violence in the host country deters 
both trade and FDI flows, where such an effect is particularly strong in developing countries; 
thirdly, WTO membership appears to counter the negative impacts on bilateral FDI flows, 
which suggests that while violence raises political risk and discourages investment flows, 
WTO membership signals a commitment to lower country risk. 
As stated above, irrespective of more positive opinions at the micro-economic level, the lit-
erature on aggregate effects shows that transnational capital flows are adversely affected by 
measures adopted to avoid the risk of terrorism. 
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70 This is consistent with empirical findings of, e.g., industrial economies which shows that economic variables 
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6.4  Political effects of counter-terrorism measures  
As in one subsection of Section 4, we also want to briefly allude to the political effects of 
counter-terrorism policies. Clearly, a detailed discussion of the repercussions of anti-terrorism 
measures on civil liberties and democratic rights surpasses the scope of this report which 
focuses on the economic impacts. However, e.g., as Tavares (2004) finds a positive relation-
ship between the resilience of economies and democratic rights, the potential negative reper-
cussions of anti-terrorism measures on democratic freedoms warrant at least a short mention-
ing; its impact on the resilience of economies could be a further field of study. 
Goderis and Versteeg (2008) find that as a reaction to terrorist threats after 9/11 human rights 
violations (e.g., in the form of torture and political imprisonment) by US allies have increased 
systematically. While some institutional constraints (e.g., in the form of an independent judi-
ciary) may reduce such negative effects, the findings nevertheless imply that in times of crisis 
a trade-off between security (in whose name human rights are constrained) and liberty exists, 
where the magnitude of such a trade-off depends on the institutional setting of affected coun-
tries. On the international level, related changes in the allocation of aid to developing coun-
tries have also been made. New practices such as increases in aid for military expenditure (in 
the name of counter-terrorism) are criticized to run counter development objectives and inter-
national commitments to human rights (Tujan et al. 2004; Beall et al. 2006). 
Thus, it is no surprise that Dreher et al. (2007) find that terrorism exercises a negative impact 
on governments’ respect for human rights. That is, the likelihood of human rights violations 
(e.g., torture, extrajudicial killings) increases in the face of terrorist threats. Even some civil 
liberties may be constrained in consequence, although the study finds no systematic effect of 
terror on political participation and other freedoms associated with a liberal political system. 
Again, the findings are dependent on country-specific characteristics, where governments 
with initially high respect for human rights are most likely to curtail them. 
Apart from the impacts of security measures on citizens’ rights in terror target countries, the 
impacts of aggressive counter-terrorism measures in terror host countries have been found to 
terrorize innocent citizens (Kivimaeki 2003). 
In general, preliminary results indicate that security measures to counter terrorism are linked 
to political costs which may (in a country-dependent and internationalized sense) manifest in 
a “terrorization” of terror-affected populations. In the name of security, governments appear 
to be willing to sacrifice certain human rights and related liberties. Ironically, such a trade-off 
implies that terrorists are successful in reaching one of their central goals (political destabili-
zation) also through counter-terrorism actions of attacked governments. Existing evidence 
also points at the importance of institutional settings of affected countries for assessing the 
‘true’ (indirect) political costs of terrorist activity that come along with counter-terrorism 
measures. As one direction of future research, analyses of the economic repercussions (in the 
form of monetary and welfare losses) probably linked to related policy measures should be 
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6.5  The determinants of the economic impacts of anti-terrorism 
policy 
In conclusion, while acts of terrorism have only temporary effects on a mature economy, this 
section has shown that counter-terrorism measures may potentially extent the impacts of ter-
rorism throughout the economy. Compared to the direct impacts of a terror attack, related 
determinants and outcomes are much more diffuse and more difficult to anticipate and cap-
ture. Even though empirical proof is scant, the available literature points to the following 
factors which at least in theory determine the economic repercussions of security measures: 
(i) the choice of security measures that are adopted, (ii) how and by whom security is pro-
vided, (iii) the economic context in which security measures are implemented and (iv) the 
effects security measures have on future terrorist attacks. 
As shown in this section, the economic effects of security measures are inter alia determined 
by the actual type of measure adopted by various economic agents. These measures do not 
only determine the actual overhead investment or financial outlay necessary but also the 
scope to create synergies between different security measures. Further, the respective security 
measures will influence the indirect impacts on the economy through, e.g., impacts on trans-
action costs and externalities.  
Actual security measures adopted by economic agents are influenced by the perception of the 
actual level of insecurity and the underlying threats; in the case of public agents, political 
considerations also matter, e.g. by choosing means to retain the confidence of their constitu-
encies and to demonstrate power towards perpetrators (Enders and Sandler 2006). Thus, espe-
cially at government level the appropriate form to reinstall security (actual and perceived) is 
often seen to lie in aggressive action. Considerations of economic impacts (often in the distant 
future and thus not easy to calculate) therefore appear to be mostly left out of policy consid-
erations.  
As importantly, actual security measures as well as the costs of these measures are determined 
by the expected behavior of other actors. Especially in the case of transnational terrorism, 
cooperation between countries is essential to maximize the cost effectiveness of counter-
terrorism measures. Non-cooperation does not only imply that a few actors have to bear the 
costs of the measures, but also, given inter-dependent security, that the measures are unlikely 
to be effective, which in turn creates disincentives to invest in certain policies. 
Security can be provided more or less economically efficiently. As the case of airport security 
shows, one major question that has not been answered so far is whether governments or the 
private sector are more effective in providing maximum security at minimal costs. Related to 
this, in theory, economic repercussions will further differ depending on the mechanisms and 
approaches (e.g., market mechanisms versus regulations) that are employed to induce security 
provision. Brück (2006) models the implications of security spending, which could be volun-
tary, in response to market forces, or forced spending due to new security regulations and 
legislation: While the first scenario (voluntary security spending) is akin to an insurance 
spending, the second (responses to market forces) may result in higher costs, yet at the same 
time could prevent or even raise revenues, while the third (regulated security spending) is 
congruent to an environmental regulation, increasing social welfare, at the expense of produc-
ers with the effect of an overall decrease in the industry’s productivity. Economic Effects of Anti-Terrorism Policy  
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Lastly, the ability to coordinate security measures across economic agents not only within but 
also between economies is likely to impact economic repercussions in two ways. Firstly, 
given the inter-dependence of security and insecurity, a failure to coordinate measures yield-
ing all links of a system may render individual security investments impotent, therefore ren-
dering no or negative returns to the investment; secondly, given potential negative impacts of 
competitiveness on involved economic sectors, the economic repercussions of security provi-
sion will also be determined by the ability to coordinate security measures across competitors 
in different economies. 
Even though little information is available, Gupta et al. (2004) suggest that security spending 
may have different effects on economies with different sizes, e.g. as a certain level of security 
spending implies a higher share in overall spending in a smaller than in a larger economy. 
However, as the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade DFAT (2004) argues, 
especially for developing economies spending on security measures can imply an investment 
into investor confidence and therefore boost economic development. Hypothetically, basic 
investments to enhance security could positively influence a smaller “less secure” economy 
up to a certain level, increasing its resilience as well as confidence of economic players in it. 
This effect could level off, the more developed the economy is, while in fact, reverse, i.e. 
create negative repercussions in highly developed and open economies due to negative im-
pacts on economic efficiency. This, however, is a hypothesis and the actual dynamics between 
security and economic development require more careful research. 
Related to this, wherever investments in security technologies are necessary, the economic 
impacts will differ depending on whether an economy is a net importer or exporter of these 
technologies. If an economy’s security sector is sufficiently large and competitive, this sector 
and the aggregate economy are likely to gain from increased investments in security. Yet, 
countries which do not produce necessary security technologies will need to import these 
goods and services. Thus, economic effects of security spending will partly be determined by 
whether a country is a net importer or exporter of security technologies and services. Long-
run costs of security measures will be determined by their actual impact on terrorist behavior. 
In the best case scenario, security policies will be effective and acts of terrorism will cease; 
however, in the worst case scenario, terrorists will adjust their behavior to undermine security 
measures which may result in more severe actions and thus increased costs from terror activ-
ity. As Enders and Sandler (2006) show, these considerations are not merely theoretical but 




7 AN  EUROPEAN  PERSPECTIVE ON THE ECONOMICS OF 
INSECURITY 
In this section, we want to re-evaluate our previous discussion, putting a special European (or 
EU) perspective on the issue of terrorism. That is, we want to (i) give an overview of historic 
and current trends in terrorist activity in Europe to assess actual threat levels; (ii) have a look 
at the causes of terrorism in Europe, acknowledging that the roots of terrorism may differ An European Perspective on the Economics of Insecurity 
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from one part of the world to the other; (iii) inspect the economic and political costs of terror-
ism; (iv) evaluate counter-terrorism efforts in Europe (with a special emphasis on EU strate-
gies) and their potential interactions with terrorist activity. Avoiding unnecessary repetitions, 
we use previously discussed academic theory and evidence; as Europe-specific evidence on 
the issue of terrorism is generally sparse, some of our appraisals are rather bases on the trans-
fer of knowledge on terrorism in other parts of the world (e.g. with respect to its causes and 
effects) to the European theater. Given the importance of the European Union as a suprana-
tional organization, we will discuss its role in combating terrorism in particular.72 
7.1  Trends of terrorism in Europe 
The TWEED dataset by Engene (2007) provides a good overview of the dynamics of domes-
tic terrorism in many European countries from 1950-2004. During this period, France, the 
United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, Germany and Greece were most hit by internal terrorism, con-
sidering a simple count of events. In fact, almost all (ca. 98%) of all internal terrorist acts 
during the period of observations were conducted in these countries. With respect to the fe-
rocity of domestic terrorism according to TWEED, during 1950-2004 over 2900 individuals 
were killed through domestic terrorism. Again, over 2800 individuals were killed in the six 
countries most affected by terrorism mentioned above. Domestic terrorist activity was more 
common in the 1970s and 1980s and these decades were also the most brutal ones. Neverthe-
less, internal domestic terrorist activity never ceased during 1950-2004. Most terrorist acts 
(about 80%) were committed by organizations with ethnic-nationalist ideologies, prominent 
groups being the ETA in Spain and the IRA in the United Kingdom. Other groups (e.g., the 
RAF in Germany or the Action Directe in France) were driven by non-nationalist (left-wing) 
ideologies (Engene 2007). While left-wing terrorism seems to be on decline since the end of 
the Cold War, domestic terrorism from ethnic-nationalist groups remains a substantial threat. 
Furthermore, European countries may increasingly face new forms of home-grown terrorism, 
drawn from a pool of a radicalized youth incited by new globalized (al-Qaeda-styled) terrorist 
networks and their propaganda (Heller 2009). 
European countries have not only been constantly plagued by internal terrorism but also by 
transnational one. Gaibulloev and Sandler (2008) use data from the ITERATE dataset and 
show that the top-six countries that suffered from transnational terrorism in the past were 
again France, the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, Germany and Greece. Transnational terror-
ism in Europe was more prominent in the 1990s than domestic terrorism, while internal ter-
rorism accounted for most of the overall terrorist activity in the 1970s and 1980s, and also 
after the year 2000. This matches with the more general perception that domestic terrorism is 
a more common phenomenon than transnational terrorism.73 Regarding transnational terrorist 
groups ideology, in the past were driven by nationalist motifs (e.g., the PLO). However, (as 
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with internal terrorism) new forms of radicalization in Europe may create a new (religiously 
motivated) wave of terrorism directed at an international audience (Heller 2009). 
Overall, Europe has been ridden by both domestic and transnational terrorism, with the rela-
tive importance of these two kinds of terrorism shifting over time. Here, some countries have 
faced the most attacks in total numbers and with respect to their ferocity. While in the past 
many organizations were incited by nationalist goals, currently a new wave of terrorism may 
develop associated with the radicalization and globalization of religiously motivated net-
works.74 
7.2  Causes of terrorism in Europe 
7.2.1 Domestic  terrorism 
As hinted at time and again, the lack of data on domestic terrorism has made an analysis of 
this specific kind of terrorism impossible. For Europe the development of the TWEED dataset 
by Engene (2007) allows to overcome these data issues. Given that the dataset is relatively 
young, only few studies have actually used in to conduct empirical analyses of terrorism 
causes similar to the ones extensively presented in Section 3 of this contribution. Further-
more, Sanchez (2009) employs a new and unique datasets. 
Krieger and Meierrieks (2009) make use of the TWEED dataset and find that social welfare 
policies exercise a significantly negative effect on the genesis of domestic terrorism, resem-
bling the findings of Burgoon (2006) for transnational terrorism. Their analysis also finds that 
larger populations are positively associated with domestic terrorism production. Overall, these 
findings suggest that economic factors (moderated through social policies) matter to domestic 
terrorism in Europe. The findings of Krieger and Meierrieks (2009) also stress the importance 
of “good” institutions (in the form of sound welfare systems) in decreasing terrorism risk, 
possibly be leveling social discontent associated with economic disparities. 
Similarly, Gries et al. (2009) who also build on the TWEED dataset find that economic 
growth is negatively related to terrorism production. In fact, the findings of Gries et al. (2009) 
provide causality evidence that economic performance leads (Granger-causes) domestic ter-
rorism but not vice versa.75 Again, this stresses the relative importance of economic factors in 
explaining domestic terrorism in Europe. In a theoretical sense, the results of these two stud-
ies imply that economic deprivation (or the lack or leveling thereof) are associated with the 
genesis of domestic terrorism in Europe. 
Using a unique dataset, the analysis by Sanchez (2009) finds that revolutionary (i.e., left-
wing) terrorism in Western Europe has been also driven by the experience of past dictator-
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ships (e.g., in Germany, Greece and Italy), where Sanchez (200) argues that this relationship 
may, e.g., be associated with past repression exerted by these very dictatorships and their 
effect on terrorist mobilization. He also finds that strong Communist parties matter to the 
genesis of terrorism, while economic factors do not matter strongly.76 
The aforementioned studies are the only ones available which analyze the determinants of 
domestic terrorism in Europe in a way comparable to the analyses presented in Section 3. 
Surely, the availability of TWEED will lead to more research on this are in the near future. 
Currently, we may assess that, first, economic success seems to matter insofar as it is distrib-
uted by means of functioning social policies. Second, political change and instability may 
have to do with terrorist activity during transition periods in Spain, Portugal or Greece, but 
also with (left-wing) terrorist activity in further countries with an authoritarian past. Here, 
terrorist organizations may find it cost-efficient to use violence against weak states to achieve 
political targets. 
Beside these factors, we may also speculate about further determinants of domestic terrorism 
in Europe, where future research on these factors is advocated. First, it seems reasonable to 
assume that ethnic factors also matter. Identity-related conflict in Spain, France or United 
Kingdom may have influenced the calculus of individuals in these regions and may have 
filled the ranks of violent organizations in these counties. However, there are parts of Europe 
where ethnic conflict abounds (e.g., Catalonia) without strong terrorist activity. That is, ethnic 
conflict may have contributed to the escalation of violence but may not be its (only) root 
cause. Second, the Cold War antagonism may have given rise to left-wing terrorist groups in 
Western Europe. For instance, such organizations may have built on the (ideological and 
financial) support of Eastern governments. The end of the Cold War has consequently led to a 
decline in left-wing terrorist violence. However, while it seems reasonable to assume that 
ethnic factors and Cold War dynamics (along other factors) may explain the patterns of do-
mestic terrorism in Europe, no study exists which analyzes these relationships empirically in 
an economic way. 
7.2.2 Transnational  terrorism 
As with domestic terrorism, there are few studies explicitly which analyze the determinants of 
transnational terrorism in Europe. However, we can draw on previously presented evidence to 
make several assumptions about transnational terrorism dynamics in Europe. As Bird et al. 
(2008) note, Europe has been one of the parts of the world most strongly targeted by transna-
tional terrorism. However, Europe is not a region that predominantly produces transnational 
terrorism. Thus, we will in the following focus on the causes of Europe importing transna-
tional terrorism. 
Bird et al. (2008) argue that rich democracies are likely targets of transnational terrorism. On 
the one hand, they are likely to be targeted by individuals or organizations from poor econo-
mies, implying that the global distribution of income motivates terrorist attacks. On the other 
hand, democracies are targeted because they are the regimes which will most likely react to 
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terrorist actions. Following this line of argumentation, Europe is targeted by transnational 
terrorism because of its economic success and relative political openness. 
Following Dreher and Gassebner (2008), countries are likelier targets of terrorism when they 
are politically close to the United States. Undoubtedly, this is the case for Europe and the EU. 
The US and its allies are targeted because of foreign policy considerations, e.g., support for 
Israel or military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan. In an economic sense, terrorist groups 
find it more cost-efficient to recruit and muster support when they can build on grievances 
associated with the existing global order dominated by Western interests. In fact, the evidence 
by Barros et al. (2007) suggests that US citizens are targeted in particular by left-wing and 
radical Islamic groups in Europe. These groups are the ones most likely incited by anti-
systemic resentment. At the same time, terrorist groups may target European countries when 
these countries are allied to the terrorist groups’ main enemy (e.g., the government of the 
terrorists’ group home country). This strategic logic matches the theoretical model by Addi-
son and Murshed (2006) where terrorists export violence by attacking the friends of their 
enemies, thereby trying to produce media attention and undermine support for their main 
antagonist. 
As Heller (2009) notes other factors may also determine transnational terrorist activity in 
Europe, especially in the context of home-grown terrorism directed at an international audi-
ence. Here, a lack of education and of social inclusion (social integration) may be named as 
determinants of terrorism. Here, institutional constraints may make it easier for terrorist 
groups to recruit new members when building on feelings of alienation and marginalization. 
In short, while there is no evidence explicitly analyzing the determinant of transnational ter-
rorist attacks in Europe, we may from existing (global) evidence conclude that European 
countries are targeted because of their economic success, their political openness and their 
closeness to the US and its general foreign policy. Other institutional factors which may con-
strain the lives of certain individuals (e.g. with immigration or minority backgrounds) create 
grievances within certain segments of a society and contribute to the radicalization of such 
groups. 
7.3  Consequences of terrorism in Europe 
7.3.1 Economic  effects 
As Europe has been attacked by domestic and transnational terrorist groups over the past 
decades, negative economic effects are anticipated. Again, the second-order (indirect) effects 
of terrorist strikes are more likely to reduce terrorist activity than the first-order (direct) ones. 
First, several studies detect negative effects of terrorist strikes on the tourism sector, particular 
analyzing the impact of terrorism on tourism in countries that are strongly dependent upon 
income streams from tourism (e.g., Enders and Sandler 1991; Enders et al. 1992; Drakos and 
Kutan 2003). For instance, Enders et al. (1992) find that terrorist activity in Greece, Italy and 
Austria has led to substantial economic losses for these countries in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Mostly, these losses stem from changes in consumer behavior (i.e. in traveling) resulting from 
terrorist activity. As the risk of terrorism in a country increases, it generally becomes more 
attractive for individuals to travel to more safe countries (cf. Drakos und Kutan 2003). An European Perspective on the Economics of Insecurity 
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Enders and Sandler (1996) also document a negative effect of terrorism on economic integra-
tion, namely on foreign direct investment (FDI). This study shows that Greece and Spain 
suffered from terrorism in the form of substantial losses in foreign direct investment (over 
10% per year). While terrorist strikes may directly damage FDI-related property, the indirect 
effect of terrorism is anticipated to be much stronger. Potential investors weigh the risk of 
investment against its future profits. Clearly, terrorism increases the risks of investment and 
thereby makes it more likely that FDI is diverted. As Enders and Sandler (1996) note, this 
effect may be stronger for smaller countries because they are less able to diversify risk and 
attract FDI from many different countries. In any case, the findings of Enders and Sandler 
(1996) demonstrate that terrorism may have a negative impact on economic integration. 
Terrorism needs not only to affect certain business sectors or economic integration in Europe. 
As Fielding (2003) for Northern Ireland shows, terrorist conflict may have large scale impacts 
on economic activity in general. He demonstrates that terrorism discourages investment, pro-
duction and employment. Again, these effects are a likely consequence of entrepreneurs re-
sponding to the uninsurable risks associated with terrorism, so they are effects of the second 
order. Similarly, Greenbaum et al. (2007) for Italy show that terrorism has a destabilizing 
impact on business activity. Terrorist activity is found to reduce business formation and ex-
pansion, and employment. Evidently, entrepreneurs react to the risk of terrorism. 
Given that terrorism in Europe appears to have negative impacts on certain business sectors in 
particular but also on production and employment in general, we may anticipate that terrorism 
reduces overall economic growth. In fact, Gaibulloev and Sandler (2008) find that terrorist 
activity has reduced economic growth substantially between 1971 and 2004. It is argued that 
domestic terrorism led to an increase in government spending (crowding out private invest-
ment in consequence), whereas transnational terrorism causes a direct crowding out of in-
vestment, without noticeable effects on government spending. However, Enders and Sandler 
(2008) argue that negative shocks stemming from terrorist activity are absorbed effectively by 
economies that exhibit good institutions and diversified markets, so growth is not impaired by 
terrorism. While it appears to be intuitive that terrorism affects certain sectors of an economy, 
it is thus unclear whether these effects feed through to overall growth. In fact, Gries et al. 
(2009) offer time-series evidence that demonstrates that growth has not been substantially 
impaired by terrorism, giving support to the reasoning by Enders and Sandler (2008). How-
ever, terrorism may damage overall economic growth on regional levels, e.g. in the Basque 
country (Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003). Negative effects on regional levels do not need to 
show up on aggregate (national) levels. 
7.3.2 Political  and social effects 
We also want to briefly discuss the more broad effects of terrorism on affected countries, 
especially in the political and social realm. 
One central goal of terrorism is political destabilization. Such effects may also be detectable 
for the European theatre, even if affected polities are usually characterized as stable. Indri-
dason (2008) shows that terrorist activity indeed influences domestic politics by affecting 
government formation. In times of terrorism, governments are formed that exhibit lower de-
grees of ideological polarization and that build on larger parliamentary majorities. Such an 
effect may be interpreted as a counter-reaction to the terrorist threat of political destabiliza-An European Perspective on the Economics of Insecurity 
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tion. Nevertheless, it shows that political effects are noticeable even in Europe. In a more 
extreme scenario, Gassebner et al. (2008) argue that terrorism threatens government survival 
as the electorate punishes failures to counter terrorism. Here, the Madrid train bombings of 
March 11, 2004 may serve as an example that such mechanisms also work in Europe. Timed 
immediately before the Spain general elections, the terrorist attacks negatively affected gov-
ernment survival, leading to the political success of the opposition party. 
On a final note, it has been argued that terrorism not only produces economic and political but 
also broader societal costs, e.g., measurable in terms of life satisfaction (Frey et al. 2009). For 
France, the United Kingdom and Ireland (as three European countries strongly affected by 
terrorism) Frey et al. (2009) show that terrorism has large negative effects on life satisfaction. 
The non-monetary losses in life satisfaction indeed translate into considerable monetary ef-
fects once converted. This finding may demonstrate that is not sufficient to look at economic 
losses (in terms of employment, investment etc.) but to also consider more holistic indicators 
(e.g., life satisfaction) which measure the impact of terrorism on the well-beings of individu-
als and their behavior.  
7.4 Counter-terrorism  policies in Europe 
7.4.1 Policy  actions 
As we have argued before, governments may act against terrorism in defensive and proactive 
ways. All related strategies aim at influencing the costs, benefits and opportunity costs in 
ways that reduce the incentives for terrorist activity. On a supranational level, the EU has 
undertaken a number of policy actions in order to influence terrorist activity accordingly.77 
One set of coordinated policies of the EU aims at reducing terrorism within its borders. The 
EU has set up an action plan of combating terrorism, as critically reviewed by Bossong 
(2008). Related coordinated policy actions include, inter alia, an increased protection of bor-
ders and critical infrastructure (Heller 2009), international intelligence cooperation (Müller-
Wille 2009), actions against terrorism financing and money laundering (De Vries 2005) and 
an adjustment of EU foreign policy so as to provide assistance and coordination in the fight 
against terrorism on a global scale (De Vries 2005; Keohane 2008). In a theoretical sense, 
actions against terrorism financing and changes in intelligence and foreign policy aim at in-
creasing the costs of terrorism, e.g. as the risk of terrorist organizations to be exposed in-
creases. An increased protection of borders and infrastructure may simultaneously increase 
terrorism costs and lower its benefits. Many of these counter-terrorism policies are directed 
against internationalized forms of terrorism. It is less likely that such actions are especially 
helpful in combating domestic terrorism, although this kind of terrorism still is a considerable 
threat to several EU member countries (e.g., Spain and Greece). 
Another way of fighting terrorism is to target the roots of terrorism, thereby influencing its 
opportunity costs in ways that reduce violence. Previously, we argued that Europe is targeted 
                                                                          
77 The counter-terrorism efforts by the EU have been developed in recent years, in particular after the events of 
September 11, 2001. They are, of course, matched by counter-terrorism efforts by member countries (e.g., efforts 
by the Spanish government against ETA, as analyzed by Barros (2003). For this review, we will mainly focus on 
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by transnational terrorism because of its economic success, political openness and foreign 
policy. Clearly, it is neither possible nor desirable to give up wealth or democracy for secu-
rity, or to let terrorist groups influence European foreign policy. In this respect, EU policies 
that aim at increasing the costs of terrorism or to reduce its benefits appear reasonable to fight 
terrorism. Nevertheless, related policy strategies have been criticized (cf., Bossong 2008). 
Fighting domestic terrorism by soft strategies appears to be more helpful. Existing evidence 
indicates that economic success and sound welfare policies discourage domestic terrorism 
within EU boarders, thus suggesting that successful economic and social policies may yield 
an additional terrorist peace dividend. At the same time, political participation for fringe 
group (e.g., ethnic minorities) may be helpful to manage conflicts along ethnic or nationalist 
lines in peaceful ways. Barros (2003) argues similarly for the case of ETA in Spain, showing 
that hard political actions against minorities (e.g., banning parties representing the Basques 
while being potentially affiliated with ETA) may backfire. 
7.4.2 Effects  of  counter-terrorism policies 
Policy actions against various forms of terrorism which have already been undertaken or 
which may (given the evidence) be implemented in the future may produce a variety of effects 
(costs). Potentially, there are economic costs. Counter-terrorism efforts divert public spending 
away from potentially more effective projects towards security. Potentially, such security 
measures are neither effective nor (economically) cost-efficient (Heller 2009). For instance, 
security measures at boarders, ports and airports produce economic costs (transportation 
costs) which may distort economic activity, while not being particularly effective security 
means at the same time. Clearly, security measures which aim at increasing the costs of ter-
rorism also increase the economic costs of other agents, thereby producing non-desirable 
second-order effects of terrorism.78 
With respect to the supranational counter-terrorism strategies of the EU, some undesirable 
effects are worth noting that are not purely economic. First, counter-terrorism strategies like 
intelligence cooperation, information exchange or migration control may endanger civil liber-
ties and democratic standards and principles with the EU (e.g., Den Boer et al. 2008; Balzaqc 
2008). Guild (2008) explicitly discusses the issue of “terrorist lists” to show that there is an 
inherent conflict between security needs which lead to coordinated security means and indi-
vidual rights. Similarly, intelligence cooperation and information exchange endanger the 
(democratic) foundations of the EU when such issues are not subject to political or judicial 
scrutiny in sufficient ways. In this respect, the second-order political effects of terrorism on 
EU level may very well contribute to erosion of democracy which may, ironically, potentially 
be a goal of terrorist attacks. 
Second, counter-terrorism strategies may lead to changes in foreign policy. Joffe (2008) notes 
that EU countries cooperate with North African countries mainly in order to combat transna-
tional terrorism (the share threat of the EU and North Africa). Basically, Joffe (2008) criti-
cizes that security concerns of the EU have replaced the European agenda to promote eco-
nomic and political development in its neighborhood. Consequently, security considerations 
trump over efforts to foster democracy and human rights protection in adjacent parts of the 
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world. Another second-order effect of terrorism in Europe is thus a change in foreign policy 
which may yield short-run benefits (e.g., improved migration control or intelligence coopera-
tion). However, by essentially backing non-democratic regions in exchange for security, the 
European strategy may contribute to the production of more grievances and thus transnational 
terrorism in adjacent parts of the world (e.g., given that empirical evidence indicates that 
repression may be one root cause of transnational terrorism). 
Third, counter-terrorism efforts by European governments may lead to transference and sub-
stitution effects. On the one hand, increases in internal security in the EU may lead to a trans-
fer of terrorist activity to countries that are less capable of defending themselves against ter-
rorism. However, transference of terrorism to other parts of the world does not imply that the 
EU (or the US) is safer. By contrast, the transfer of terrorist activity may mean that terrorist 
attack European (and American) citizens more strongly abroad instead of attacking them in 
their home countries (cf. Enders and Sandler 2006). 
Similarly, counter-terrorism efforts by the EU may also induce a change in the tactics of ter-
rorists. As Jackson et al. (2007) show, terrorist groups are capable of adapting to counter-
terrorism measures, e.g., by using different kinds of weapons or organization. For instance, a 
tightened airport control may simply result in an increased vulnerability of other parts of the 
transportation system, making attacks on public buses or trains more likely. 
Given that counter-terrorism efforts may produce a number of economic and political effects 
and may even significantly influence terrorist behavior, future research should surely focus on 
this are in particular. 
7.5 Summary 
Europe has been targeted by domestic and transnational terrorist groups, with the relative 
importance of these two kinds of terrorism shifting over time. While in the past many organi-
zations were incited by nationalist or left-wing goals, currently a new wave of terrorism may 
develop associated with the radicalization and globalization of religiously motivated net-
works. There is little systematic evidence on the causes of domestic and transnational terrorist 
activity in Europe. Some evidence links domestic terrorist activity to economic decline and 
poor institutions. However, other factors are also anticipated to matter (e.g. ethnicity, history). 
Some factors which may constrain the lives of certain individuals (e.g. with immigration or 
minority backgrounds) create grievances within certain segments of a society and contribute 
to the radicalization of such groups, thus potentially providing the breeding ground for new 
(radicalized or religious) terrorist activity in Europe. At the same time, Europe has been tar-
geted by internationalized terrorism. Here, one may suggest that these attacks are driven by 
European economic success, its political openness and closeness to the US (i.e., to European 
foreign policy). 
Terrorism in Europe has negatively impacted certain business sectors (e.g. the tourism indus-
try), also affecting production, employment and overall economic growth. However, it is 
disputed whether economic shocks from terrorism produce long-run costs for countries that 
exhibit good institutions and diversified markets (as the EU countries) on national levels. 
Rather, it is more likely that terrorism damages economic activity in regions (at the sub-An European Perspective on the Economics of Insecurity 
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national level) most hit by terrorism. Still, the political and social costs of terrorism must not 
be underestimated, e.g. in terms of losses in life satisfaction. 
Counter-terrorism efforts have (besides activity in national levels) been coordinated by the 
EU as a supranational organization. This counter-terrorism activity aims largely at increasing 
the costs of terrorism (e.g. by aggravating money laundering). Even as appeasement towards 
domestic and transnational terrorists does not seem to be an option (as this would mean e.g. 
giving up territory or changing foreign policy), the counter-terrorism efforts of the EU have 
been criticized. On the one hand, they produce negative (second-order) effects on the econ-
omy. On the other hand, they may endanger civil liberties and democratic standards within the 
EU or may lead to unfavorable biases in the EU’s foreign policy. One may argue that such 
negative (second-order) effects of counter-terrorism and security efforts on the economy, and 
internal and external politics may produce new terrorism in Europe and abroad that is directed 
at the EU) or may make such a production at least more likely.  
 
 
8  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
Our analysis of the existing literature provides a number of insights regarding the direct and 
indirect impacts of terrorism on the economy. Hence, our survey shows the importance to 
differentiate between the direct impacts of terrorist attacks, the indirect impacts which arise 
from response reactions of economic agents, consumers, producers and the public sector and 
the longer term adaptation of terrorist groups to a new security environment. The direct eco-
nomic impacts of terror attacks appear to be determined by the nature and scale of the actual 
attack, the structure and functioning of the economic system and the behavior of economic 
agents to mitigate the impacts of terror.  
While much of the literature concentrates on the direct impacts of terror attacks, the analysis 
reiterates the argument of Chen and Siems (2004) and Brück (2006) that impacts resulting 
from security responses of economic agents could incur more significant economic repercus-
sions than the direct impacts of a terror attack. This leads to the important questions whether 
counter-terrorist policy should focus on reducing the risk of low probability events or rather 
on containing economically sub-optimal responses to terror and how to reconcile security 
with the principles of a liberalized global economy. 
One important feature of global terrorism is its objective of harming the twin processes of 
economic growth in developed countries and of globalization in general; terrorism therefore 
has an important economic dimension. While the direct economic repercussions of terrorism, 
especially the repercussions of 9/11 have been very visible, what is less obvious and thus less 
entrenched in public awareness are the economic consequences of security measures and 
counter-terrorism policies. Most countries are committed to create and safeguard an area of 
freedom and security while at the same time building an area of prosperity and economic 
growth. Yet, the interplay between security, insecurity and economic prosperity are only pre-
liminary understood in academic and policy circles. Our survey provides an overview of the 
executing research and it aims to map the “state of play of research” on the inter-relations 
between the economy and security with particular focus on terrorism, and to identify the level Conclusion and Recommendations  
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of knowledge on the interaction between the cost distribution of both terrorism and anti-
terrorism measures. Furthermore, it analyses the existing knowledge on the macro-economic 
impacts and the current understanding of underlying processes at micro-economic level. Apart 
from considering aggregate indicators such as fiscal and trade impacts, investment, growth 
and productivity, the survey assesses the existing research on the impacts of insecurity on 
behavioral patterns of consumers, households, the private sector (in general, as well as spe-
cific sectors) and policy makers, whose behavior constitute the drivers underlying the aggre-
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